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Abstract
In the cross-border killing context, individuals are left without
a remedy. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits are currently split on the
issues of whether the Fourth Amendment extends to protect noncitizens shot and killed by a United States Customs and Border
Protection Agent at the United States-Mexico border and whether
a Bivens cause of action is available in this context. This Comment
will explore the legal reasoning for both circuits’ conclusions and
the legal arguments for and against each issue. This Comment will
argue that the sufficient voluntary connections test should not be
applicable in the cross-border killing context. This Comment will
also argue that the courts’ analysis should return to the roots
of Bivens and emphasize whether there are any adequate
alternative remedies available rather than the special factors
present in each case.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 10, 2012, border patrol agent Lonnie Swartz shot
and killed sixteen-year-old J.A., a Mexican citizen walking down a
street in Mexico near the United-States-Mexico border.1 J.A. did not
pose a threat to Swartz and “was not committing a crime,”2 yet was
brutally shot ten times.3 What happened to J.A. is a tragedy, but
common reality as the United States has increased militarization
at the United States-Mexico border.4 To achieve the ideal concept of
a “secure border,”5 the United States has poured millions of dollars
into border enforcement.6 Research has shown that border
militarization has led to an increase of “deaths at the border.”7 The
question remains what protections are afforded to non-citizens who
are killed at the border.8
*Juris Doctor, UIC John Marshall Law School 2020
1. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. Id. The court takes the facts as they are plead in the complaint and
assumes they are true. Id.
3. Id.
4. Jeremy Slack, et al., The Geography of Border Militarization: Violence,
Death and Health in Mexico and the United States, 15 J. LATIN AM. GEOGRAPHY
10-11 (2016).
5. Id. at 10 (noting that no politician has been able to describe what
constitutes a secure border, yet this is what the goal is in massive and increased
spending).
6. Id.
7. Id. (noting various studies that have showed: exponential increase in
border deaths since the 2000s, increase in migrant death rates “after
implementation of prevention through deterrence strategy”, and hiring of
previous military personnel).
8. Id. (Slack notes the dire nature of this question as border patrol funding
has increased tremendously over recent years: funding for the Secure Border

2020]

Extending Fourth Amendment Protections

345

The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect non-citizens against a deadly seizure
by a United States border patrol agent.9 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment does protect non-citizens
from a deadly seizure under similar circumstances.10 The Ninth and
Fifth Circuits remain split over whether the Fourth Amendment
protects such individuals and whether they may bring a claim for
damages under the Supreme Court decision Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.11 Under a Bivens
claim, a government agent may be sued for damages, but only under
circumstances in which a Bivens claim has been extended.12 This
Comment will first discuss the contrary decisions of the Ninth
Circuit and Fifth Circuit concerning Fourth Amendment
protections as applied to non-citizens and whether Bivens extends
to deadly force imposed on non-citizens at the border. This
Comment will then discuss the primary arguments in favor and
against the extension of Fourth Amendment rights to non-citizens
shot and killed at the border and the primary arguments applied to
extending or limiting a Bivens cause of action in this context.
Finally, this Comment will propose that courts should not
consider the substantial connections test under United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez13 when the issue involves a non-citizen shot and
killed at the border. The analysis should turn on the agent’s actions
and the specific circumstances surrounding the shooting. The
question of extending Bivens should emphasize the lack of adequate
alternative remedies in this context. Focusing on a lack of
alternative remedies is consistent with the original basis of creating
a Bivens cause of action.

II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”14 The Supreme Court first noted in Tennessee v. Garner
that “there can be no question that apprehension by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.”15 Under the policy of the United States
Initiative had increased “to $800 million in 2010, totaling $4.5 trillion in
spending” between 2005 and 2010.) Id.
9. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018).
10. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 737.
11. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a federal agent acting under the
color of law that violates the constitution may be sued for damages).
12. Id.
13. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
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Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “deadly force may only be
used if an agent has a reasonable belief . . . that the subject of such
force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury
to the agent or another person.”16 The use of unreasonable deadly
force is undoubtedly a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but
the question remains whether a non-citizen is afforded this
protection.
Considering the Fourth Amendment and the protection it
provides citizens of the United States, it is important to consider the
application of the Fourth Amendment to those that are non-citizens.
This is crucial to the cross-border killing context. This Comment
will first introduce the concept and implications of applying the
Fourth Amendment to individuals located outside of the United
States who are also non-citizens, such as J.A. and Sergio
Hernandez. This Comment will then discuss Bivens and the
importance of understanding Bivens when there may be no other
opportunity for an individual killed at the border to have any
possible recourse under the law. Finally, this Comment will
introduce the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions that create a circuit
split on these two issues: applying the Fourth Amendment
extraterritorially and whether Bivens may extend to the crossborder killing context. Both issues are separately discussed by the
courts, but both are important in understanding a non-citizens
rights, or lack thereof, under the United States Constitution.

A. Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth
Amendment
For J.A. or Sergio Hernandez to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the court must
decide that the Fourth Amendment applies to a non-resident, noncitizen extraterritorially. Applying the Constitution outside of the
borders of the United States has had two polarized views.17 The
“strict territorialists” believe the Constitution does not apply
outside of the United States at all whereas the “universalists
believe it applies everywhere.”18 The Supreme Court recognized a
“compromise approach in Boumediene v. Bush.”19 In Boumediene,

16. Roxanna Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings By U.S.
Border Agents, 27 BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (2017) (citing a Memorandum
from Michael J. Fisher, Chief of U.S. Border Patrol, on Use of Safe Tactics and
Techniques, to U.S. Custom’s and Border Protection Personnel at 1 (Mar. 7,
2014)).
17. Shawn E. Fields, From Guantanamo to Syria: Extraterritorial
Constitution in the Age of “Extreme Vetting,” 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123, 1129
(2018).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the Supreme Court held that enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay were entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under the United States
Constitution.20 The Court adopted a “functional approach” to the
question of extraterritoriality by providing a flexible approach to
deciding whether the Constitution extends in a particular case.21
Boumediene is a starting point for determining whether the Fourth
Amendment applies extraterritorially in Hernandez and Rodriguez.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez provides additional
framework for analyzing whether the Constitution applies to noncitizens who reside outside of the United States. Under VerdugoUrquidez, the court must consider whether the non-citizen has
sufficient voluntary connections with the United States to avail
themselves of the protections of the Federal Constitution.22 The
sufficient voluntary connections test considers any connection the
individual may have to the United States, but primarily focuses on
citizenship, residence, and any “voluntary attachment” to the
United States.23 Both Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene are
essential to the Fifth and Ninth Circuit’s reasonings and contrary
conclusions. The extraterritorial reach of the Fourth Amendment is
necessary for an individual killed at the border to have any legal
recourse. As this Comment will explain later, a constitutional
violation is necessary for the individual to recover under Bivens,
which likely is the individual’s only viable opportunity for a legal
remedy.

B. Importance of a Bivens Claim for Damages
Understanding Bivens is crucial to understanding the
distinctions made between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. Bivens
held that a federal agent that violates the Constitution while acting
under the color of law may be sued for money damages.24 In Bivens,
federal agents searched and arrested Bivens without a warrant.25
The Court heavily weighed the fact that a claim for money damages
against federal agents was the only possible remedy for Bivens.26
The Court in Bivens held that the individual could sue federal
officials for the violation of Fourth Amendment rights.27 While
Bivens allows a person to recover against a federal agent that

20. Id.; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
21. Fields, supra note 17, at 1147.
22. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
23. Id. at 274-75.
24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 394. (noting how protections against trespass and invasion of
privacy are inconsistent or even hostile to protecting the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures).
27. Id. at 397.
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violated their constitutional rights, “it is not an automatic
entitlement.”28
Under Bivens, the victim can sue the individual federal officer
for violations of the victim’s federal constitutional rights.29 Bivens
allows an individual “suffering a compensable injury to a
constitutionally protected interest to invoke the general federalquestion jurisdiction of the district court . . . to obtain an award of
monetary damages against the responsible federal official.”30 To
recover under a Bivens claim, the individual must show a violation
of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution by a federal
official acting under the “color of law.”31 The availability of Bivens
as a remedy depends on the context in which it is being applied.32
A Bivens claim for damages extends to a new context when
there is no other adequate alternative remedy and when there are
no special factors causing the court to hesitate in the absence of
congressional action.33 The Court in Bivens itself noted that there
were “no special factors” present to cause the Court to hesitate in
extending a Bivens claim in the context of the case.34 In extending
a Bivens claim to a new context, the Court considered how other
remedies, such as state laws of trespass, are inadequate to right the
constitutional wrong.35 The Court also noted that damages have
been historically accepted as a remedy for invasions against
personal interests.36 Additionally, no special factors, such as an
impact on federal fiscal policy, warranted hesitation against
extending a claim for damages in that context.37
Courts have been reluctant to extend Bivens to new contexts;
it is a “‘disfavored’” judicial activity.38 While Bivens itself
emphasized a lack of adequate alternative remedies, courts in
applying Bivens have shifted, “focusing less on the nature of the
plaintiff’s constitutional right and more on ensuring separation of
28. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
29. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Remediation of Constitutional Harm
through Bivens Action in Immigration Context, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 201, 2 (2019).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 737.
33. Id. at 738.
34. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
35. Id. at 394.
36. Id. at 395-396 (citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Hernandon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); and Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487
(1902)).
37. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 -97 (noting how this was not a question of federal
fiscal policy and it did not involve imposing liability on a congressional
employee); contra U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947) (refusing
to extend a claim for damages against a negligently injured soldier that would
require the Government to pay his medical expenses).
38. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
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powers between the Legislature and the Judiciary.”39 In light of
Ziglar v. Abbasi, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has
significantly limited cases in which Bivens may be extended.40 The
Supreme Court has refused to extend a claim for money damages in
numerous contexts. For example, the Court did not extend Bivens
for a First Amendment claim brought by an employee against their
superior.41 The Court also barred a Bivens claim against a federal
government agency42 and an Eighth Amendment negligence claim
in a prison context.43 The basis of Bivens itself, however, rested in
part on the absence of alternative remedies, which is crucial in the
cross-border killing context.44 Abbasi, however, has been criticized
“for reversing the pro-remedy default position that had prevailed
since the Framers’ day.”45

C. The Circuit Split
In the Ninth Circuit case, Rodriguez v. Swartz, defendant
Lonnie Swartz was a CBP Agent on duty as a United States Border
Patrol Agent at the United States-Mexico border.46 Swartz shot and
killed J.A., a Mexican citizen walking down a street in Mexico.47
Swartz shot J.A. while Swartz was standing on American soil and
J.A. was on Mexican soil.48 The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth
Amendment extended to protect J.A. from deadly seizure by an
agent acting on American soil.49 The court also held that a Bivens
claim for damages extended to this context in the absence of an
39. Christian Patrickwoo, The “Final Blow” to Bivens? An Analysis of Prior
Supreme Court Precedent and the Ziglar v. Abbasi Decision, 43 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 511, 547 (2017)(explaining how Abbasi itself may have “issued the ‘final
blow’ to Bivens availability in any situation—‘with the exception of claims
mirroring the very specific facts of its early decisions.’”) Id. at 516.
40. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
41. Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens
cause of action brought by a federal employee against their superior based on
the superior’s disciplinary actions against the employee for exercising his First
Amendment rights because the question was meant for Congress)).
42. Id. (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (holding that an
individual cannot sue a Federal Government agency under Bivens because of
the potential extraordinary financial burden it would place on the Government
and because it is a question properly left to Congress)).
43. Id. (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (refusing
to extend Bivens against a private corporation contracted with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons)).
44. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
45. Peter S. Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for
Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1153, 1167
(2018).
46. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 731.
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alternative remedy.50 Bivens extended because there were no
special factors present.51
The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez v. United States held to the
contrary under factually similar circumstances.52 The court held
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect a non-citizen, Adrian
Hernandez Guereca, shot at the border as a result of unreasonable
deadly force.53 In Hernandez, a teenage Mexican citizen was shot
and killed at the border. He did not have a claim against the agent
under Bivens and was not protected by the Fourth Amendment.54
Hernandez was decided after the Supreme Court remanded the case
to determine whether Bivens should extend and avoid the Fourth
Amendment question entirely.55 On remand, the Fifth Circuit
refused to extend Bivens to the new context of a Mexican citizen
shot at the border on Mexican soil by a border patrol agent standing
on American soil.56
1. Ninth Circuit Holding
a. Fourth Amendment protections extend to non-citizens
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez distinguished J.A.’s case from
the Supreme Court case, Verdugo-Urquidez, in its discussion of
extending the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially.57 The court
noted that Swartz acted on American soil, and therefore American
law would control his actions.58 Federal agents in VerdugoUrquidez knew that the property was owned by a Mexican citizen,
whereas Swartz did not know J.A.’s citizenship status.59 Therefore,
J.A.’s connections to the United States were not relevant to the
extension of Fourth Amendment rights.60 Verdugo-Urquidez
occurred solely on Mexican soil while agent Swartz acted on
American soil.61 The court in Rodriguez concluded that “there are
50. Id. at 739
51. Id. at 734, 739, 744.
52. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. Hernandez also involved a non-citizen, shot
and killed while on Mexican soil, by a border patrol agent standing on American
soil. Id.
53. Hernandez v. U.S., 757 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2014).
54. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814.
55. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007-8 (2017).
56. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823.
57. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-731. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271
(applying a “sufficient voluntary connections” test to hold that the Fourth
Amendment did not extend to a noncitizen where United States and Mexico
agents searched defendant’s home without a warrant or probable cause).
58. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31.
59. Id. at 731.
60. Id.
61. Id. (noting that Verdugo-Urquidez involved a search on Mexican soil
whereas here, the United States agent acted on American soil, so there would
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no practical obstacles to extending the Fourth Amendment” to a
case involving unreasonable use of deadly force by a federal agent
on American soil.62
b. Bivens extends to the cross-border killing context
The Ninth Circuit held that Bivens extended in that case and
Rodriguez could sue to recover monetary damages.63 In extending
Bivens, the court noted that there was no adequate alternative
remedy64 and no special factors existed, such as executive branch
policy of regulating terrorism risks, that would be of concern in
extending Bivens.65 The dissenting opinion noted that the court
lacked authority to extend Bivens to the cross-border context and in
doing so “the majority creates a circuit split, oversteps separation of
powers principles, and disregards Supreme Court law.”66
2.

The Fifth Circuit Holding

In Hernandez v. United States, a fifteen-year-old Mexican
citizen was shot and killed by a CBP Agent.67 “Hernandez and his
friends were playing a game that involved running up” and touching
the fence between the United States and Mexico.68 The CBP Agent,
Mesa, shot and killed Hernandez while he was standing on United
States soil and Hernandez was standing on Mexican soil.69 The
Fifth Circuit held that Hernandez was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.70
a. Fourth Amendment rights do not extend to a non-citizen
in a cross-border context
Applying the sufficient voluntary connections test from
Verdugo-Urquidez,71 the court held that Hernandez lacked
not be an imposition of regulating an action in Mexico).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 734.
64. Id. at 739, 741-42 (noting that the United States has sovereign immunity
and could not be sued under the Federal Torts Claims Act due to the “foreign
country exception” or the Westfall Act because it bars state tort claims, and
explaining that restitution is not adequate in this case because it would only be
available if Swartz was convicted of killing J.A. as a criminal offense and there
is no evidence a Mexican court could grant a remedy). Id. at 739-41.
65. Id. at 744.
66. Id. at 749 (Smith, J., dissenting).
67. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 255.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 266.
70. Id.
71. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the respondent was
not protected by the Fourth Amendment because he was a citizen of Mexico,
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sufficient voluntary connections with the United States to invoke
Fourth Amendment Protections.72 The court considered how
Hernandez was a citizen of Mexico who “had no interest in entering
the United States” and did not have societal obligations to comply
with immigration laws.73 Other circuits74 have also relied on
Verdugo-Urquidez to limit the extraterritorial effect of the Fourth
Amendment.75
The Fifth Circuit en banc affirmed the decision and concluded
that the court properly dismissed Hernandez’s claims because he
did not have a Fourth Amendment claim without significant
voluntary connections to the United States.76 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and narrowed the issue because the Fifth Circuit
did not address whether Bivens would extend to the situation.77 The
case was remanded and the Fifth Circuit was instructed to consider
Bivens in light of Ziglar v. Abbasi.78
had “no voluntary attachment to the United States,” and his home was located
and searched in Mexico, so he did not have sufficient voluntary connection to
the Unites States and was not protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
72. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266. But see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 283
(Brennan J., dissenting) (arguing that the important connections at issue are
those that the government has to the individual—in this case, the government
decided to investigate Verdugo-Urquidez and subject him to life in a United
States prison, so the sufficient connection is thereby supplied by the
government and not the individual).
73. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266.
74. Id. at 265. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir.
2012), is cited as the case that used Verdugo-Urquidez to “limit the Fourth
Amendment’s extraterritorial effect.” Id. However, in Ibrahim, the Ninth
Circuit held that Ibrahim had a significant voluntary connection with the
United States during her four years at Stanford University to be protected
under the First and Fifth Amendments when she was detained and placed on a
“No-Fly-List” and prevented from returning to the United States. Ibrahim v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 986-97.
75. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 265 (citing U.S. v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324,
1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that aliens do not enjoy Fourth Amendment
protection unless they have significant voluntary connection with the United
States)). See also U.S. v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008)
(applying Verdugo-Urquidez to refuse to extend Fourth Amendment to a noncitizen with only involuntary connection to the United States).
76. Hernandez v. U.S., 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015).
77. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
78. Id. at 2006-7. Abbasi addressed a claim by six non-citizens against high
executive officers for their detainment policies and harsh conditions of
detainment after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1851.
The Court refused to extend a Bivens claim for damages against the executive
officers because of the special factors present, primarily that national security
policy is suited for the executive branch – not the judicial branch. Id. at 1861.
The Court concluded that the absence of congressional action here warranted
hesitation in extending a Bivens claim to a new context. Id. at 1862, 1869. As a
result, the Court refused to extend Bivens to the challenge against detainment
policies. Id. at 1869.
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b. Bivens claims do not extend to a non-citizen in a crossborder killing context
On remand, the Fifth Circuit refused to extend Bivens to the
context of deadly force used against a non-citizen by a U.S. border
patrol agent.79 The Fifth Circuit held that a cross-border shooting
is a new context for a Bivens claim, relying heavily on the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Abbasi.80
In Abbasi, a new context was established even though both
Abbasi and Bivens involved Fourth Amendment violations.81 The
court noted that the absence of another remedy does not indicate
that improper border patrol agent action will not be deterred.82 For
example, the agent may be criminally prosecuted.83 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) was, in fact, prosecuting the CBP
Agent in the Ninth Circuit case.84 State tort law also acts as a
deterrent and source of damages.85
The court also focused on the special factors that go against
extending Bivens to this new context, including threatening
supervision of national security by the executive branch, increasing
risk of interfering with foreign affairs, and the silence of congress
indicating a purposeful lack of legislative action.86

D. Summary of Ninth and Fifth Circuit Holdings
Both the Ninth Circuit and Fifth Circuit cases are factually
similar yet come to contrary conclusions. Both cases involve young
Mexican citizens, shot and killed by a CBP agent who was acting on
behalf of the United States, while the agent was standing on
American soil.87 The Fifth Circuit case of Hernandez v. Mesa
utilized the Verdugo-Urquidez analysis of sufficient voluntary

79. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814.
80. Id. at 816-817.
81. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. The Court in Abbasi considered how Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) refused to extend Bivens to a
new context under the Eighth Amendment when it “would not advance Bivens’
core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional
wrongdoing.” Id.
82. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 821.
83. Id.
84. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 757.
85. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 821. The Fifth Circuit noted that a state tort
claim is unavailable in this case because Agent Mesa was protected by the
Westfall Act as he acted in the scope of his employment. Id.
86. Id. at 818-20.
87. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 719, 727; Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814.
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connections and was bound by Supreme Court precedent to do so.88
The Ninth Circuit case of Rodriguez v. Shwartz distinguished the
case from Verdugo-Urquidez and did not apply the sufficient
voluntary connections test.89 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a
non-citizen may be protected under the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription of unreasonable deadly seizures.90
The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez concluded that a Bivens claim
did not extend to a non-citizen shot and killed at the border by a
border patrol agent—the individual had no remedy to sue the agent
for monetary damages.91 The Fifth Circuit emphasized the special
factors that counseled against extending Bivens.92 Allowing a
Bivens claim in a cross-border killing context may interfere with the
power of the executive and legislative branches over national
security and foreign affairs.93 The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez
extended Bivens to allow the non-citizen to sue for damages.94 The
Ninth Circuit found no special factors to prohibit extending Bivens
here.95 Without a Bivens claim, Rodriguez lacked any adequate
remedy.96 The Ninth Circuit also noted other contexts in which a
Bivens claim has been extended or granted.97 The Ninth Circuit
highlighted the other contexts to demonstrate that Bivens may be
appropriate under certain circumstances.98 The Ninth Circuit’s
analysis also discussed the same cases as the Fifth Circuit did to
support their conclusion to allow a Bivens cause of action.99 It is
important to understand how the Ninth and Fifth Circuits use
similar analyses to reach opposite conclusions.

88. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266.
89. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31.
90. Id.
91. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 734.
95. Id. at 744.
96. Id. at 739, 744.
97. Id. at 736. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 231, 248-49 (1979)
(holding that there was a valid claim for damages against a congressman’s
violation of an individual’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights based on
employment gender discrimination); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16,
25 (1980) (extending a Bivens claim against prison officials for monetary
damages).
98. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 737 (“Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, therefore
establish that plaintiffs can sue for damages for certain constitutional
violations.”).
99. Id. at 735-38 (citing Lucas, 462 U.S. at 367, 388-90 (1983); Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681-82, 684
(1987); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 471,
484; Robbins, 551 U.S. at 537, 561-62; Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 125
(2012)).
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III. ANALYSIS
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits rely on similar precedents and
factors for the respective analyses, and yet reach opposite results
regarding the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment
and extension of Bivens.100 The opposite conclusions of Rodriguez
and Hernandez need to be critically analyzed and reconciled. First,
this Comment will discuss Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez in
the context of extending Fourth Amendment rights to non-citizens
in cross-border killings. This Comment will then explore the
arguments for and against extending a Bivens cause of action to this
context. Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits analyze Boumediene and
Verdugo-Urquidez to come to opposite conclusions concerning the
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment.101 Both
courts consider Abbasi and reach distinct conclusions with respect
to extending Bivens to the cross-border killing context.102

A. Does the Fourth Amendment Apply
Extraterritorially to a Non-Citizen Killed at the
Border?
1. Boumediene Considerations
Both circuits considered Boumediene v. Bush in their analysis
for the possible extension of Fourth Amendment rights to noncitizens.103 In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus under the United States Constitution.104 Habeas corpus is a
constitutionally provided process that protects an individual’s
“right to be free from wrongful restraints on their liberty.”105 The
United States Constitution establishes the writ of habeas corpus
and provides that it should not be suspended unless required by
public safety.106 Both habeas corpus and the Fourth Amendment are
constitutionally provided and protected. The application of both

100. Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31, with Hernandez, 757 F.3d at
266 (relying on and considering Verdugo-Urquidez and Abbasi and the same
factors for evaluating extension of a Bivens claim).
101. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-32, 739-40; Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 262,
266.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
105. Ann K. Wooster, Jurisdiction and Ability of Federal Court to Grant Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Proceeding Concerning United States Citizen Detained or
Allegedly Constructively Detained by United States Military, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 2d
1, 2 (2019).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 2.
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habeas corpus and the Fourth Amendment to non-citizens, outside
of the United States, have been questioned.
Boumediene involved non-citizens who were enemy
combatants that were imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.107
The issue was whether the writ of habeas corpus extended to noncitizens.108 The Court considered various factors, including
sovereignty, “the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequate process through which status determination was made,”
“the nature of sites where apprehension and then detention took
place,” and “practical obstacles inherent in resolving entitlement to”
habeas corpus.109 Sovereignty is not the only relevant factor to
determine how far the Constitution reaches, although it is one
factor.110 In Boumediene, the Court concluded that the habeas
corpus right did apply to non-citizen enemy combatants, in
Guantanamo Bay.111
a. Arguments in favor of extending Fourth Amendment
protections to non-citizens
Boumediene can advance the argument that Fourth
Amendment rights apply to non-citizens.112 Cross-border killing
cases have advanced a “new legal theory” that the functional
approach in Boumediene should be applied to the cross-border
killing context.113 The Ninth Circuit discussed Boumediene in
Rodriguez, noting that Guantanamo Bay’s location in Cuba was
relevant, but the United States had practical control over
Guantanamo Bay.114 Geography in Rodriguez was also relevant as
Mexico has sovereignty and control over the street where Swartz
shot J.A.115 The Ninth Circuit considered J.A.’s citizenship status,
where the shooting occurred, and practical concerns that may arise,
emphasizing that citizenship and voluntary submission to
American law are not determinative factors.116 Boumediene can
ultimately be used to support extending Constitutional rights to
non-citizens.117 Just as the Court in Boumediene extended habeas
corpus remedies to non-citizens, the Court should arguably be
107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 766.
110. Id. at 764.
111. Id. at 771.
112. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 729-30.
113. Evan Bitran, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign
Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 230
(2014).
114. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 729-30.
115. Id. at 730.
116. Id. at 729.
117. Id.
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justified in extending the Fourth Amendment protection to noncitizens.
b. Arguments against extending Fourth Amendment
protections to non-citizens
The Fifth Circuit used the same considerations under
Boumediene to conclude that Fourth Amendment protections do not
extend to non-citizens in Hernandez.118 When determining whether
a constitutional principle applies abroad, the court must balance
the potential of applying Fourth Amendment rights to non-citizens
and the countervailing government interest.119 “[T]he question is
which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the
particular circumstances [and] the practical necessities.”120
Practical obstacles to extending Fourth Amendment rights
extraterritorially include consequences of the United States’ actions
abroad, determining “substantive rules that would govern the
claim,” and possible tension with a foreign government.121 There are
functional considerations as well, such as the length of the border,
the number of crossings every year, and the implication of Fourth
Amendment extension on border patrol agent surveillance
technology.122 Functional considerations may disrupt the legislative
and executive function in responding to foreign situations in the
interest of the United States and confuse CBP Agents’
understanding of the standard of reasonableness legally applied to
their actions.123
2. Verdugo-Urquidez Considerations
Verdugo-Urquidez can be used both in support and opposition
of extending Fourth Amendment protections to non-citizens killed
at the United States-Mexico border.124 Verdugo-Urquidez held that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search and seizure by
agents of the United States in Mexico.125 Verdugo-Urquidez was a
Mexican citizen that was believed to be involved in drug
smuggling.126 United States and Mexican law enforcement agents
118. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 262.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75, 787 (1957)(alteration in
original) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
121. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 262.
122. Id. at 266-67.
123. Id. at 267.
124. Compare Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266, with Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 73031 (reaching opposite conclusions although both discuss and rely on VerdugoUrquidez).
125. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
126. Id. at 262.
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searched his home in Mexico without a warrant or probable
cause.127 In holding that the Fourth Amendment did not protect
Verdugo-Urquidez from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Court noted how textually, “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.”128 The
Court looked to the voluntary connections that the individual had
with the United States to determine if they had availed themselves
to constitutional protection.129 Verdugo-Urquidez had very little
voluntary connections to the United States because he was a
Mexican citizen and lived in Mexico.130 Whereas if VerdugoUrquidez was a resident alien of the United States, he may have
been afforded some protections under the United States
Constitution.131 The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to Verdugo-Urquidez because he was a Mexican
citizen with no voluntary connection or societal obligation to the
United States.132 Practical considerations also warned against
applying the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially.133 The Court
noted how a warrant would not have a legal effect outside of the
United States and the executive branch would be severely impeded
with uncertainty.134

127. Id. at 262-64. The fact that Mexican agents were also involved is
significant to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis that distinguished Verdugo-Urquidez
from Rodriquez. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 731. The Ninth Circuit considers how
the type of search in Verdugo-Urquidez implicates Mexican sovereignty and
involves practical concerns of regulating conduct on Mexican soil and by
Mexican agents. Id. Rodriguez did not implicate such practical concerns. Id.
128. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. The court in Rodriguez recognized
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez. Rodriguez, 757 F.3d at
730. The court noted that Kennedy would not place any weight on the text of
“the people” in the Fourth Amendment but agreed that it would be impractical
to warrant Fourth Amendment protections abroad. Id.
129. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
130. Id. at 262, 271.
131. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that illegal
resident aliens are protected by Equal Protection for access to education); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not limited to protect only citizens, rather, it applies to all within
the territorial jurisdiction, including resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 147-48 (1945) (finding that resident aliens were entitled to First
Amendment freedom of speech and press).
132. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273. But see id. at 283-84 (Brennan J.,
dissenting) (finding that there was an obvious connection between VerdugoUrquidez and the United States as he was investigated by the agents of the
United States and the government was thereby trying to subject him to United
States law—the government creates the connection to the United States rather
than any action by Verdugo-Urquidez).
133. Id. at 274.
134. Id.
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a. Arguments in favor of extending Fourth Amendment
protections to non-citizens
While the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez refused to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to a non-citizen in a search and seizure
context, Verdugo-Urquidez can be distinguished and used in
support of extending Fourth Amendment rights to non-citizens. The
Ninth Circuit found the application of Verdugo-Urquidez to be
improper in the cross-border killing context.135 Swartz, the CBP
agent in Rodriquez, acted completely on American soil whereas the
agents in Verdugo-Urquidez, acted on Mexican soil, which follows
that American law controls in this case.136 Additionally, VerdugoUrquidez relied on the impracticality of extending the Fourth
Amendment to situations involving foreign nations and the
uncertainty this would impose on the executive branch.137 The
Court in Verdugo-Urquidez was specifically concerned with the
application of warrants and searches abroad.138 The practical
concerns in Verdugo-Urquidez in applying warrants abroad and
regulating conduct on Mexican soil are not present in cases like
Rodriguez where the CBP agent acted within the United States.139
b. Arguments against extending Fourth Amendment
protections to non-citizens
The primary argument against the extraterritorial application
of the Fourth Amendment to a non-citizen is that the non-citizen
did not have sufficient voluntary connections with the United
States to avail himself of its constitutional protections.140 VerdugoUrquidez has been used by courts, including the Fifth Circuit, to
limit the extraterritorial reach of the Fourth Amendment.141
Hernandez was a citizen of Mexico, allegedly had no interest in
entering the United States, and was only playing a game that
involved running up to the border—he did not have societal
obligations and was not trying to violate immigration laws by
crossing the border.142 These considerations, coupled with the
impractical effect of extending Fourth Amendment protections,
support not extending the Fourth Amendment to non-citizens.143
Other circuits have refused to extend the Fourth Amendment

135. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730.
136. Id. at 731.
137. Id. at 730.
138. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274.
139. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 731.
140. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 265.
141. Id.
142. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266.
143. Id.
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or other constitutional rights under the Verdugo-Urquidez analysis.
In United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, the First Circuit relied on
Verdugo-Urquidez when they refuse to extend a Fourth
Amendment claim to a non-citizen claiming an unreasonable search
and seizure.144 Vilches-Navarrete was a Chilean citizen that did not
reside in the United States and was in international waters when
his ship was searched for possible drug-trafficking.145 The court
relied on Vilches-Navarrete’s citizenship and residence to conclude
that he did not have voluntary connections to the United States.146
Vilches-Navarrete was brought to the United States so his ship
could be inspected, but this is an example of an involuntary
connection.147 The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Emmanuel
refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection against an
unreasonable search and seizure because the defendant was a
“resident of the Bahamas with no significant voluntary attachment
to the United States.”148 Both Vilches-Navarrete and Emmanuel
demonstrate how the Verdugo-Urquizez voluntary connections test
weighs heavily on residency and citizenship.

B. Extending a Bivens Claim to the Cross-Border
Killing Context
Under Bivens, an individual may sue a federal agent for
damages if that agent, while acting under the color of law, violated
the Constitution and there is no cause of action permitted under the
Federal
Tort
Claims
Act
(FTCA).149
The
FTCA
requires consent by the United States for certain tort claims
brought against it, “including certain claims about abusive federal
law enforcement officers.”150
144. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d at 13 (noting how there were no substantial
connections to the United States because the defendant was brought to the
United States for the purpose of searching his ship and he thus had no sufficient
voluntary connection to the United States).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1331. Even though Emmanuel involved
wiretapping the Eleventh Circuit noted how the wiretapped telephones were
located in the Bahamas. Id. The fact that the conspiracy for drug trafficking
that was alleged was directed at the United States was not sufficient for the
sufficient voluntary connections to the nation to afford the defendant Fourth
Amendment protections. Id.
149. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (holding an individual could sue federal
agents for damages when they searched his home without probable cause and
without a warrant). “Color of law” is defined as “[t]he appearance that some act
is allowed or required by law. Color of law is the apparent authorization by law
of some action that would be otherwise forbidden.” THE WOLTERS KLUWER
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (2012).
150. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 739.
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Courts can consider three factors to determine if Bivens should
be extended: if there is a new context present, if there are “special
factors” to consider, and if there are adequate alternative
remedies.151 To determine if the present case is a new context, the
court will consider if “the case is different in a meaningful way” from
prior Bivens contexts.152 “Special factors” are factors that give the
court pause before extending Bivens.153 For example, there is a
concern over extending Bivens absent congressional action to
provide a remedy.154 The Court tends to disfavor extending Bivens
claims to new contexts and courts should exhibit caution when they
do so.155 There is also a concern over extending Bivens if it affects
the separation of powers – which poses the question of whether the
courts should authorize a suit for damages rather than Congress.156
Generally, the Legislature is considered to be in a better position to
decide where there is a “host of considerations that must be weighed
and appraised” because it should be committed to “those who write
the laws, rather than those who interpret them.”157 For example,
the Court in Abbasi relied on Congress and the President’s role in
national security policy as a special factor that weighed against
extending Bivens.158 The implications on the separation of powers
were crucial to the Court’s holding in Abbasi that refused to extend
Bivens to the prisoners confined after the September 11th attacks.159
1. Arguments Against Extending Bivens to Non-Citizens
Arguments against extending Bivens beyond the border
emphasize the idea that the courts should exercise caution when
extending Bivens due to implications on separation of powers
principles.160 The Supreme Court in Abbasi noted many cases where
it has refused to extend Bivens in new contexts.161 Abbasi was
151. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864-65.
152. Id. at 1859.
153. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
154. Id.
155. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. The Court reasoned that caution must be
exhibited in extending Bivens because it would be better suited for the
legislature to determine if a new legal liability should be imposed. Id.
156. Id. at 1848.
157. U.S. v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1954).
158. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1857. The Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens
liability to any new context or new category of defendants.” Malesko, 534 U.S.
at 68.
161. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. See Lucas, 462 U.S. at 390 (refusing to
extend Bivens to a First Amendment claim against a federal employee); Meyer,
510 U.S. at 473 (refusing to extend Bivens to a claim against a federal
government agency); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414 (holding that Bivens did not
extend to alleged improper denial of federal disability benefits in the face of
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considered a new context, even though there were very little
similarities between the Fourth Amendment claim in Abbasi and
the claim in Bivens.162 In Abbasi, the Court considered the Fourth
Amendment claim against the detention policy, including strip
searches, to be a different context from an unreasonable search and
seizure claim in Bivens.163 The argument against extending Bivens
to a cross-border shooting context is “[t]hat there has been no direct
judicial guidance concerning the extraterritorial scope of the
Constitution and its potential application to foreign citizens on
foreign soil.”164 The Fifth Circuit argued that this is a new context
and that Bivens should not be extended due to the presence of
special factors.165
There are numerous special factors for extending Bivens
presented by the cross-border deadly force context.166 Just as the
Court in Abbasi stressed that national security is an essential
function of Congress and the President, extending Bivens in the
cross-border killing context could undermine border patrol’s ability
to enforce the law and perform their duties related to national
security.167 Extending Bivens here could cause CBP agents to
second-guess their decisions in high-pressure situations due to the
threat of liability.168 There is also the risk that extending Bivens
absence of congressional action in the existing remedial scheme); Chappell, 462
U.S. at 297, 305 (holding that those in the military cannot sue to recover
damages from their superior officer for race discrimination); Stanley, 483 U.S.
at 683 (refusing again to extend Bivens to the military context due to the unique
disciplinary nature of the military); Minneci, 565 U.S. at 120 (holding that there
was no right to a claim for damages for an Eighth Amendment violation in the
prison context because there were adequate alternative remedies); Robbins,
551 U.S. at 541 (holding that a landowner did not have a Bivens claim against
the Bureau of Land Management for harassment and intimidation).
162. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860. The claims in Abbasi alleged that the
detention policy after September 11 violated the detainee’s due process and
equal protection rights and Fourth Amendment rights by “subjecting them to
frequent strip searches.” Id. at 1858.
163. Id. at 1864.
164. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817.
165. Id. at 814. The Fifth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’s refusal in
Verdugo-Urquidez to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a foreign citizen
whose property was searched by United States agents and the Supreme Court’s
own description of Hernandez’s case as raising “sensitive” issues. Id. at 817.
166. Id. at 818.
167. Id. at 819. Congress has explicitly given border patrol agents authority
to protect our nation in the interest of national security. Id. (citing 6 U.S.C. §
211 (e)(3)(B) (2017)).
168. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861. See also Vanderklok v. U.S., 868 F.3d 189,
207-9 (3rd Cir. 2017) (refusing to extend Bivens in an airport security context
where a TSA agent was charged with constitutional violations). The court in
Vanderklok similarly relied on the special factor in Abbasi because TSA agents
are tasked with securing national security in airports and possible liability in
the form of monetary damages could increase the probability that TSA agents
would hesitate in making decisions, which would undermine their purpose in
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here could “interfere with foreign affairs and diplomacy.”169
Additionally, Congress’s silence with respect to cross-border
killings may indicate what its view on the issue is.170 Congress has
not extended a remedy themselves but could do so if they wanted to
– especially considering the increased interest in the area of border
security.171 Congress’s inaction may indicate that Congress is
deliberately not providing a remedy in the cross-border incident
context.172 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction . . . to the deprivation of any
rights . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”173
The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez found that § 1983 “implies the
absence of a damages remedy” in the cross-border context because
it provides that a state or local official may be sued for damages by
“any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof.”174 The language of
§ 1983 arguably
demonstrates Congress’s intent to not provide a remedy in the
cross-border context and only provide one to citizens of the United
States or someone within its jurisdiction.175 The Fifth Circuit also
noted that even if Bivens is not available to deter agents from using
deadly force, there is an adequate deterrent in criminal
investigations and charges against the agent.176
2. Arguments in Favor of Extending Bivens to Non-Citizens
Hernandez, in the Fifth Circuit case, argued that an
unprovoked shooting by a federal officer is an excessive force claim
that is not a new context under Bivens.177 A new context is defined
as being different in a “meaningful way.”178 It is also recognized
that federal law provides damages for claims in similar contexts
securing our national security in this context. Id. at 207.
169. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 819. The Fifth Circuit additionally noted that
there is a joint Border Violence Prevention Council between the U.S. and
Mexico, where such issues can be addressed and imposing liability may
interfere with the dialogue between Mexico and the United States. Id. at 820.
170. Id. at 820 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862).
171. Id. “It is much more difficult to believe that congressional inaction was
inadvertent’ given the increasing national policy focus on border security.” Id.
(citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862).
172. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 820.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
174. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 742 (citing § 1983).
175. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 820.
176. Id. at 821. (noting that the CBP agent in Rodriquez v. Swartz is being
criminally charged).
177. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 816.
178. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.
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where constitutional violations arise.179 Therefore, one argument in
favor of applying Bivens in the cross-border killing context is that
this context is not different from a context where a Bivens claim is
already recognized. The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez found the crossborder killing to be a new context but concluded there were grounds
to extend a Bivens even though it is a disfavored judicial activity.
If there is a new context, Bivens can be extended if there are
no special factors causing the judiciary hesitation in extending a
cause of action for damages.180 The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez
concluded that there were no “special factors” that apply to prohibit
extending a Bivens claim in the cross-border killing context.181
Abbasi involved a challenge to a high-level executive detention
policy.182 Extending Bivens here would not implicate national
security.183 The petitioners in Abbasi challenged a policy employed
by the executive and legislative branches after the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001,184 and was, therefore, better-suited for
either branch to handle.185 The cross-border shooting context
without a threat to national security does not implicate executive or
legislative powers over national security.186 Imposing liability in the
cross-border killing context would not deter border patrol agents
from carrying out their duties as Swartz had no duty to shoot J.A.
in Rodriguez.187 In fact, “border patrol agents have faced Fourth
Amendment Bivens claims in the past.”188 Extending Bivens also
does not implicate foreign policy because policymaking individuals
are not the target of the lawsuits.189 For example, in Rodriguez,
Swartz is sued as a federal agent rather than as a policymaking

179. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Breyer J., dissenting). The dissent argues
that the situation in Abbasi is no different than longstanding Bivens law as a
compensatory remedy for a constitutional tort and it falls within the scope of
traditional constitutional tort law. Id.
180. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 738-39.
181. Id. at 744.
182. Id. at 745 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860-61)).
183. Id.
184. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853. Petitioners in Abbasi specifically challenged
the detention policy employed by the executive which clearly implicated the role
of the executive branch and triggered the notion of separation of powers which
ultimately becoming a driving force in the decision. Id. at 1858-59.
185. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 745.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 746.
188. Id. Compare Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir.
2006) (finding that a non-citizen had sufficient connections to the United States
to allow a Bivens claim for Fourth Amendment violations of excessive force and
unlawful arrest by a Border Patrol agent), with Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102,
1106-07 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s Bivens claim against Border
Patrol agents that repeatedly stopped their shuttle in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
189. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746-47.
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individual.190
Ultimately, there are no adequate alternative remedies
available in cross-border shooting cases that are factually similar to
that of Rodriguez or Hernandez.191 The United States cannot be
sued without its own consent under the FTCA.192 The FTCA allows
for monetary damage awards.193 Even though the government
consents to certain tort claims against officers of the United States
through the FTCA, they still maintain the explicit exception “that
the United States cannot be sued for claims arising in a foreign
country.”194 Therefore, even if the federal officer could be sued in an
official capacity under the FTCA, the foreign country exception
would likely bar relief because the FTCA prevents the United States
from being sued for claims arising in another country.195
In the case of Rodriguez, there was no adequate relief in state
tort law because of Arizona’s Westfall Act.196 The Westfall Act
grants immunity to state officials in claims arising out of acts taken
during their official duties, including their scope of employment.197
Restitution is not an adequate remedy as an alternative to damages
because even if the agent commits a crime, the government has
discretion in charging the agent.198 Additionally, the burden of
proof is higher in cases where the government charges the agent
compared to a Bivens claim against the officer; a conviction is only
secured in a criminal case if the claim is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas the standard of proof in a Bivens claim is more likely
than not.199 Even if the agent is found not guilty for criminal
charges, he or she may be liable for monetary damages, so a
criminal suit alone is not an adequate remedy.200 The Ninth Circuit
rejects the argument that § 1983 precludes a Bivens remedy by
providing that “any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof” cannot bring a suit for money
damages.201 The purpose of enacting § 1983 was to ensure that state
190. Id.
191. Id. at 739.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2012). This is known as the “foreign
country exception.” Id.
195. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 739.
196. Id. at 741 (citing Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007)).
197. Id. The court in Rodriguez explained that “[u]nder the applicable law,
an employee ‘acts within the scope of employment when performing work
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control.’” Id. If Swartz was ‘on duty’ when he shot J.A., then it seems
that he would have been acting within the scope of his employment even if he
violated rules governing his conduct. Id.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2012).
199. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 742.
200. Id.
201. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 739 (citing § 1983). The opposing argument is
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officials could not easily escape liability in cases of constitutional
violations and not to preclude suit for damages in cross-border
shootings.202 It is unlikely that Rodriguez, or someone similarly
situated, could seek an adequate remedy in a Mexican court.203
Mexican courts would likely not have jurisdiction over the CBP
agent.204 It would also be nearly impossible to execute a judgment
against the CBP agent without violating state immunity laws.205

C. Summary of Analysis
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment analysis consists primarily of
Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez considerations. Under
Boumediene, a court must consider the geography involved,
sovereignty over that geography, and any practical concerns that
may arise with applying a constitutional right extraterritorially.206
Under Verdugo-Urquidez, a court must consider whether there are
sufficient voluntary connections between the non-citizen claiming
the right and the United States.207 Verdugo-Urquidez could be used
to argue that a Mexican citizen with no ties to the United States
cannot be afforded Fourth Amendment protection.208 In the
alternative, Verdugo-Urquidez can be rejected by distinguishing its
application of sufficient voluntary connections to a Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search and seizure case to an
unreasonable deadly seizure case.209
2. Bivens Claim
When considering whether to extend a Bivens claim, a court
must consider if the case presents a new context, if there are any
special factors to counsel hesitation in the absence of congressional
action, and whether there are alternative remedies already
available.210 If there is a special factor present, the court may not
extend a Bivens claim for damages to the new context.211 The Fifth
Circuit refused to extend Bivens in Hernandez because it was a new
that Rodriguez cannot be sued because he was not shot in the jurisdiction of the
United States and was not a United States citizen. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 742-43.
206. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
207. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
208. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266.
209. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31.
210. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864-65.
211. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d 738.
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context and there was a special factor present – interfering with the
executive branch’s function and its power over foreign affairs and
diplomacy.212 The Ninth Circuit extended Bivens in Rodriguez
because they did not find any special factors present and there was
no alternative adequate remedy available.213 The same analysis is
used, yet contrary conclusions are made. The question remains
which conclusion should be adopted in light of these narrow, yet
grave circumstances.

IV. PROPOSAL
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is instructive and should be
considered if the Supreme Court of the United States grants
certiorari to resolve this circuit split. Under the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, the Fourth Amendment should be extended to protect
non-citizens against unreasonable deadly force and a Bivens claim
for damages should extend to a non-citizen that is killed at the
border by an agent of the United States. This is crucial to grant a
remedy to an individual who is killed by a border patrol agent and
who has no other source of a remedy.
First, this Comment will propose that the Verdugo-Urquidez
sufficient voluntary connections test should not be applied to the
cross-border killing context. Then, this Comment will set the
reasoning to extend the Fourth Amendment and a Bivens claim to
the cross-border killing context. Regarding Bivens, this is an effort
to revert back to the original motivation behind Bivens: to provide
a remedy where there is no other adequate, available remedy.

A. The Fourth Amendment Should Extend to the CrossBorder Killing Context
First, the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient voluntary connections
analysis should be rejected in the context of unreasonable deadly
force exerted by a border patrol agent against a non-citizen.214 As
the Ninth Circuit observed in Rodriguez, the factual differences
between Verdugo-Urquidez and the killing of a non-citizen at the

212. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 819.
213. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744.
214. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (holding that a Mexican
citizen with no significant voluntary connection with the United States did not
have Fourth Amendment protection from an unreasonable search of his home
and seizure of his property). In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Verdugo-Urquidez only addressed “the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that [was] owned by a nonresident alien and located in a
foreign country.” Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. at 261).
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border are apparent.215 Verdugo-Urquidez involved a search and
seizure of a Mexican citizen’s property in Mexico, whereas in
Rodriguez, the border patrol agent acted on American soil, where
American law controlled, and the agent could not have known
whether J.A. was a Mexican or American citizen.216 Furthermore,
the practical considerations of Verdugo-Urquidez do not apply to
Rodriguez because the court in Verdugo-Urquidez was concerned
with regulating conduct in Mexico, but the agent in Rodriguez was
acting on American soil.217 Verdugo-Urquidez had a specific concern
that extending Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures to a Mexican citizen would
impact law enforcement abroad and foreign policy operations that
may involve searches or seizures.218 There is no such relevant
consideration in cases that involve unreasonable deadly force
employed by a border patrol agent acting on American soil—the fact
that a non-citizen is killed while on Mexican soil is not dispositive.
The voluntary connections test set out in Verdugo-Urquidez is
simply irrelevant to cases where a non-citizen is shot at the border
by an agent acting on American soil. Verdugo-Urquidez notes that
if one has voluntarily associated itself with the United States, then
it has accepted some societal obligations and therefore can be
considered “among the people of the United States.”219 However, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the textual analysis of the Fourth
Amendment is not conclusive.220 The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez
relied on precedent, history, and practical concerns to hold “that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search and seizure
of…property,” a context that is extremely different than
unreasonably deadly force used by an American agent against a
non-citizen of the United States.221 Verdugo-Urquidez hinged on, in
part, the practical considerations of issuing a warrant to be applied
abroad, but this has no relevance here.222 There are ultimately “no
practical obstacles” in extending the Fourth Amendment in the case
of unreasonable use of deadly force of an agent acting on American
soil.223
Alternatively, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez
215. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730-31.
216. Id. at 731.
217. Id.
218. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
219. Id. at 266. The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez suggested that “the people”
in the Fourth Amendment refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.” Id. at 265 (citing United
States ex re. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)).
220. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 730.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 731.
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noted an alternative analysis that could apply justly to the context
of a non-citizen shot and killed at the border by an American
agent.224 Justice Brennan noted that the majority misses an
obvious connection—that Verdugo-Urquidez was investigated and
prosecuted for violations of the laws of the United States and would
have to be in a prison of the United States.225 Brennan argues that
the connection is supplied by the government and not by the
individual claiming protection from the Fourth Amendment.226
Brennan’s dissent is a valid application of the voluntary sufficient
connections test that would offer protection to an individual in the
cross-border killing context. Analogous to Brennan’s argument, an
agent that decides to arbitrarily shoot a non-citizen at the border
creates a connection between the United States and the non-citizen
that should afford the non-citizen protections under the laws of the
United States—“[i]f we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should
be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we
investigate, prosecute, and punish them.”227 An agent that uses
unjustified deadly force against a non-citizen has created sufficient
connection and we should, therefore, protect the non-citizen with
the Fourth Amendment.

B. Bivens Should be Extended to Provide a Claim for
Damages for a Non-Citizen Unjustifiably Killed at
the Border
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for extending Bivens is
demonstrative of factors the Supreme Court should consider in the
cross-border killing context. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
should re-examine the weight of the factors in deciding whether to
extend a Bivens claim to a new context—the lack of an adequate
alternative remedy should control, even in the presence of a “special
factor” to provide a remedy in unique situations where there is no
other recourse. This is consistent with the original spirit and
holding of Bivens.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rodriguez, that Bivens does
extend to this new context, concluded that there were no special
factors present to weigh against extending Bivens to this new
context.228 A cross-border shooting case factually similar to the
224. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Brennan J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan criticized the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez for holding “the
Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our criminal laws abroad,
but when Government agents exercise this authority, the Fourth Amendment
does not travel with them.” Id. at 282.
225. Id. at 283.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 284.
228. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744.
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Ninth Circuit case should extend a Bivens claim for damages to this
type of new context. The Ninth Circuit noted that, unlike Abbasi,
which is considered a challenge to high-level executive branch
policy, there are no special factors at issue in this new context and
only principles of excessive force cases apply to Swartz’s action.229
There was also no implication of national security in the Rodriguez
context because a border patrol agent needlessly killing someone at
the border does not implicate national security—there was no
special factor at play here. There was no threat to national security;
therefore, holding the agent responsible would not interfere with
executive action and discretion when the original action is not
justified in the first place.230 Finally, there are no foreign policy231
implications because there is no applicable American foreign policy
in regard to the types of shootings in these cases and there is no
risk of undermining international relations. 232 Under this unique
context, there are no special considerations that would outweigh the
absence of adequate alternative remedies.233
The Ninth Circuit noted the lack of alternative remedies
available to a non-citizen killed at the border—which necessitates
an extension of Bivens to this new context. Without a Bivens claim
for damages, a non-citizen killed as the result of unreasonable
deadly force by an agent of the United States would not have any
adequate remedy. The “foreign country exception” under the FTCA
essentially means that the United States is immune from all claims
based on any injury in a foreign country, so a non-citizen shot and
killed while on Mexican soil would not be able to sue the
government under the FTCA.234 There is likely no state law tort
claim against a border patrol agent due to the Westfall Act, which
would likely bar any state tort claim brought against the agent.235
The Westfall Act grants immunity to federal employees from tort
claims arising out of actions they took “within the scope of his office
or employment.”236 The Ninth Circuit also noted that trying an
agent for manslaughter or murder and paying restitution to an
estate if the agent is found guilty is not an adequate remedy because
the government has the discretion to charge him; it is the
government’s remedy, and guilt must be found beyond a reasonable
doubt rather than a preponderance of evidence as in a Bivens
229. Id. at 744-45.
230. Id. at 745-46.
231. “[M]ere incantation of the magic words ‘foreign policy’” does not “cause
a Bivens remedy to disappear.” Id. at 746. (citing Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 830
(Prado, J., dissenting)).
232. Id.
233. Bivens itself found that there were no special factors to cause the court
to hesitate without “affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
234. Rodriquez, 899 F.3d at 739.
235. Id. at 741.
236. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(1) (2012).
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claim.237 Additionally, it is unlikely that a remedy could be granted
by a Mexican court as it would not have jurisdiction over the federal
agent and, even if there was a remedy in a Mexican court, enforcing
a judgment from a Mexican court would violate the Westfall Act.238
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “for Rodriguez, it is damages
under Bivens or nothing, and Congress did not intend to preclude
Bivens.”239 In light of the absence of a special factor and a lack of an
adequate remedy, the Ninth Circuit held that “Rodriguez is entitled
to bring a Bivens cause of action against” the border patrol agent.240
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis should be applied to extend Fourth
Amendment protections from unreasonable deadly force to a noncitizen shot by an official acting on American soil and should extend
a Bivens cause of action to these individuals as well under
circumstances similar to the Ninth and Fifth Circuit cases.

C. Reevaluating the Bivens Analysis
It would be consistent with the reasoning behind Bivens to
weigh the absence of adequate alternative remedies in favor of
extending Bivens, even if there is a special factor present. Basic
notions of fairness and justice require this change in a context
where no other relief is available. Bivens itself did not rely solely on
the fact that there were no special factors present and focusing on
the “special factor” analysis rather than the lack of adequate
remedies already available misapprehends the reasoning behind
Bivens. Bivens depended, in part, on the fact that other remedies to
address “trespass and the invasion of privacy” may be “inconsistent
or even hostile” to the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.241 The Court stresses that there is no safety for the citizen
except for constitutional rights invaded by officials of the
government in these cases.242 Additionally, the Court noted that the
idea of suing for damages from a federal official that violates
constitutional rights is hardly surprising—“damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interest
in liberty.”243 Considering the Court’s emphasis on a lack of
adequate remedy in the absence of a Bivens claim in contrast with
the one sentence stating that the case involved no special factors
counseling hesitation, the Court’s analysis should give significant

237. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 741-42.
238. Id. at 742-43. The court also noted a brief that cites Mexican law that
suggests that border patrol agents cannot be sued in Mexican courts in these
cases. Id. at n.146.
239. Id. at 744.
240. Id. at 734.
241. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
242. Id. at 395.
243. Id.
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weight to the absence of an adequate remedy as opposed to refusing
to extend a Bivens claim in the presence of any special factors. The
nature of Bivens itself and the injustice of the cross-border killing
context, where there is no other recourse, compel this analysis.

V. CONCLUSION
When a border patrol agent acting on American soil shoots and
kills a non-citizen with absolutely no justification, there is no
possible remedy or recourse for the deprivation of the individual’s
life. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in extending Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable deadly seizures to non-citizens
killed at the border and a Bivens claim for damages against the
agent recognizes the lack of an adequate remedy elsewhere. It is
time we held agents of the United States responsible for their
actions. The fact that their actions impact a non-citizen does not
mean that the individual should be deprived of their life without
any possible recourse or repercussions. Basic notions of fairness and
justice compel this conclusion and we must at least allow the
opportunity of a possible remedy.

